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CASE IN SUPPORT OF APPLICATION OF THE
EXPEDITING ACT TO ANTITRUST SUITS
EMANUEL CELLER*
HE Spring-Summer issue of the De Paul Law Review presents
"The Case for Eliminating Direct Appeal to the Supreme Court
in Civil Antitrust Cases."' That comment, like most other pub-
lished articles 2 on the question of amending the Expediting Act,8 pre-
sents a one-sided picture. One reading them would suppose that the
only bar to the changes proposed is the impediment to all progress-
inertia.
It is the thesis of this article that, on the contrary, there are sub-
stantial reasons for rejecting this attack upon the Expediting Act.
That act contains two major provisions: first, it provides that in
civil actions, brought under the federal antitrust laws or under the
Interstate Commerce Act, in which the Government is the plaintiff, a
three-judge court may be convened upon the filing, by the Attorney
General, of a certificate that the case is one of public importance.4
Secondly, it provides for a direct appeal to the Supreme Court from
a district court's final decision in civil antitrust suits brought by the
Government.'
I. PROPOSED REVISIONS OF THE EXPEDITING ACT
Two bills have been introduced in the Congress to modify these
provisions of the Expediting Act. One,0 sponsored by the American
1 13 DEPAUL L. REv. 261 (1964).
2 See Gesell, A Much Needed Reform-Repeal the Expediting Act for Antitrust
Cases, 1961 ANTiTusT L. SYM. 98; Wiener, Federal Regional Courts: A Solution for
the Certiorari Dilemma, 49 A.B.A.J. 1169, 1172 (1964). But Mr. Wiener suggests that
the appeal in Government civil antitrust cases might go to special regional appellate
courts rather than to the ordinary federal courts of appeals. See also Comment, Proposed
Amendment to Expediting Act Would Eliminate Direct Appeal to Supreme Court, 39
N.Y.U.L. REv. 319 (1964).
3 Act of February 11, 1903, 32 Star. 823, as amended; 15 U.S.C. S 28-29 (1958) (herein-
after referred to as the Expediting Act).
4 15 U.S.C. S 28 (1958).
5 15 U.S.C. S 29 (1958). 6 S. 1811, 88th Cong., 1st sess. (1963).
* HONORABLE EMANUEL CELLER (D-N.Y.), Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary,
United States House of Representatives. J.D., Columbia University 1912.
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Bar Association, would retain the provisions of that act for cases aris-
ing out of the Interstate Commerce Act but would exclude antitrust
cases.7 It would also make applicable to antitrust cases the interlocu-
tory appeal provisions of the general federal statute on that subject.
The other bill,' sponsored by the Department of Justice, would
amend section 2 of the Expediting Act in several ways. It would limit
direct appeals to the Supreme Court from final judgments by a district
court in both antitrust and Interstate Commerce Act cases to occasions
where either the Attorney General, or the district court at its own
instance or on request of a party, certified that the case was one of
general importance. Also, the case would have to be one in which the
Government was the plaintiff.' In addition, the bill also provides that
if the Attorney General files a certificate after final judgment of the
district court, section 1 of the Expediting Act would not apply.
Unlike the ABA bill, the Attorney General's bill makes applicable
only the interlocutory appeals provisions of the Judicial Code pertain-
ing to injunctive orders,10 and not the broader interlocutory appeal
provisions1 of the Code. 2
The Judicial Conference of the United States has disapproved the
ABA-sponsored bill. It has approved S. 1892, with an amendment
eliminating the right of the Attorney General to file a certificate with-
out first obtaining leave of court."
II. RETENTION OF SECTION I OF THE EXPEDITING ACT
The argument for repealing section 1 of the Expediting Act as to
antitrust cases is that it has fallen into disuse. There are several rejoin-
ders to make to this contention. In the first place, it is clear that it has
not been used so often as to impose any material burden upon the
7 The bill makes clear that a party to an antitrust civil suit brought by the Govern-
ment could apply to the Supreme Court for certiorari under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1)
(1958), before judgment was rendered by a court of appeals. This provision may
create some internal ambiguities, not the least of which is that section 2 of the Expedit-
ing Act which refers to "Acts," is not proposed to be amended.
8 S. 1892, 88th Cong., 1st sess. (1963).
9 The proposed bill is silent as to its effect on the time provisions for appeals to the
Supreme Court.
10 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a) (1) (1958).
128 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1958).
12 The reason for this difference has not been explained.
13 REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES,
1963, at 76-77.
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courts, which might result from three judges frequently having to sit
as a district court.' 4
Secondly, although its use in interstate commerce cases is almost un-
known, the American Bar Association bill would permit section 1 to
apply to cases under the Interstate Commerce Act.' 5
Thirdly, there are times when its use is desirable.' It was used with
good effect in the Paramount case,' 7 and a three-judge court was re-
quested in a major bank merger case in 1963.18
III. ANALYSIS OF ARGUMENTS FOR REPEAL OF SECTION 2 OF
THE EXPEDITING ACT
The real controversy focuses on section 2 of the Expediting Act-
direct appeal to the Supreme Court. In 1962, in Brown Shoe Co. v.
United States,19 Justice Harlan, in the course of arguing that the judg-
ment before the court was not a final one, also questioned the advis-
ability of direct appeals to the Supreme Court from final judgments in
government civil antitrust cases.2° A similar view was espoused by
Justice Clark." In 1963, in the Singer case,22 all the members of the
14 See infra, note 16.
15 It has been said that, as long ago as 1950, the Department of Justice questioned the
right of direct appeal in I.C.C. cases, and suggested that the Judicial Review Act be
made applicable to the Commission. See Solomon, Repeal of the Expediting Act-A
Negative View, 1961 ANTITRUST L. SYM. 94. Three-judge courts are provided for under
certain provisions of the Interstate Commerce Act. Last year, sixty-seven such courts
were called into being. See DIRECTOR OF ADMIN. OFFICE OF U.S. COURTS, ANN. REPT.
1963, at 143. One might think that such a situation would invite the attention of the bar
and the bench.
16 In a communication to the Judicial Conference in 1952, the Department of Justice
made the following statement:
"The awareness of the Department of Justice of the burden which the appointment
of a three-judge court imposes on the discharge of other judicial business is shown by
the fact that expediting certificates have been filed in only six cases in the last 15 years.
In cases such as those six, however, the establishment of a three-judge court seems to
the Department of Justice to be essential." REPT. OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE
UNITED STATES, 1952, p. 31. And see Solomon, op. cit. supra note 15, at 94.
17 United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131 (1948).
18 United States v. Crocker-Anglo Nat. Bank., 223 F.Supp. 849 (N.D. Cal., 1963).
Compare this fact with the statement of Mr. Gesell, in 1961, that "The Attorney Gen-
eral ... and their associates in the Antitrust Division do not dare ask for a three judge
court. .. ." Supra, note 2 at 100.
19 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
20 Id. at 363-64 (dissenting in part and concurrent in part).
21 Id. at 355.
22 United States v. Singer Manufacturing Co., 374 U.S. 174, 175 (1963), note 1. The
Justices referred to an article by Gerhard A. Gesell. See supra, note 2.
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Supreme Court, except Justice White, expressed the opinion that time
has proven that direct appeals in antitrust cases are unsatisfactory,
Justice White expressly disagreed with that statement.23
One year prior to the Brown Shoe case opinion, an attorney, well
known for his able representation of defendants in antitrust cases, had
described the Expediting Act as "archaic, anachronistic and nonsensi-
cal" 24-he had just lost an antitrust case in the Supreme Court which
he had won in the district court.
a) The sun has not set on antitrust issues.-The primary apology
for repeal of the Expediting Act is that at the time of the enactment of
that act, antitrust law was novel and had had little interpretation.
Now, some seventy years after the enactment of the Sherman Act, it
is asserted that antitrust cases generally are barren of legal issues and
present merely issues of fact for determination by appellate courts.2 5
It is submitted that this argument has little validity. If the rationale
for direct appeal to the Supreme Court were limited only to the ques-
tion of the importance and novelty of the legal issues in government
civil antitrust cases reaching the Supreme Court during the last decade
or two, the rationale would be amply supported. 2 The contrary posi-
tion of "nothing new under the sun" finds little support in the history
of antitrust litigation.
The Expediting Act was enacted in 1903. Almost thirty years later
Professor Milton Handler, a leading antitrust authority, asserted that
Supreme Court cases had not "covered the entire range of problems,
much remains unexplored and undecided, much that has been passed
upon is still enshrouded in uncertainty and doubt.' 27
23 Id. at 197.
24 Gesell, A Much Needed Reform-Repeal the Expediting Act for Antitrust Cases,
1961 ANTITRUST L. SYM. 98. Since it was cited in the Singer case, Mr. Gesell's article
cannot be overlooked although it may be challenged.
25 "The legal issues in most civil antitrust cases are no longer so novel or unsettled
as to make them especially appropriate for initial appellate consideration by this Court,
as compared with those in a variety of other areas of federal law." Harlan, J, dissenting
and concurring in part, in the Brown Shoe Co. case. 370 U.S. 294, 364 (1962).
"Except in rare instances, the important issues which arise in antitrust cases today are
factual rather than legal." Comment, The Case for Eliminating Direct Appeal to the
Supreme Court in Civil Antitrust Cases, 13 DE PAUL L. Rav. 261 (1964).
"We go to the Supreme Court, I submit, primarily on fact cases these days. There
isn't any law to be decided in most antitrust cases." Gesell, op. cit. supra note 24, at 100.
2 6 Few who have kept in touch with the writings and statements of antitrust critics
in recent years have not found the most repeated complaint one of uncertainty as to
the meaning and scope of the antitrust laws.
27 Handler, Industrial Mergers and the Antitrust Laws, 32 COLUM. L. REv. 179, 183
(1932).
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In the late 1930's and early 1940's, Thurman Arnold, head of the
Antitrust Division, was announcing his intention to bring antitrust
cases involving patents in order to obtain a judicial determination of
the application of the antitrust laws to patent agreements.
In 1962, Professor Handler commented that,
Antitrust since its inception has been in a state of ferment....
There is no prospect that the time will ever come when antitrust will
come to rest. We shall always be confronted with many unresolved prob-
lems of administration, enforcement, substantive doctrine, and procedural
method. I thus see an ever-challenging future for the student of antitrust.28
In August 1964, a widely publicized comment by the Morgan
Guaranty Trust Company had this to say:
In one momentous year-from June 17, 1963 to June 22, 1964-the Su-
preme Court of the United States rewrote the rule book governing merg-
ers and acquisitions in American business .... The Court reached back to
the trust-busting era of the first President Roosevelt to reinstate a legal
doctrine, long in disuse, barring any business combination which elimi-
nates "significant competition." It also reached forward to assert new au-
thority to ban mergers judged to preclude the possible future development
of competition.29
This, we submit, is strong testimony in support of a view of the
kinetic nature of the antitrust field of law and a strong refutation of
the unsupported thesis that antitrust law has reached the age of stagna-
tion.
Antitrust statutory law did not become frozen in 1903.0 In 1914
the Clayton Act"' was enacted. In 1950 the Celler-Kefauver Amend-
28 Handler, Some Unresolved Problems of Antitrust, 62 COLUM. L. REv. 930, 957, 958
(1962). In an introduction to a 1963 article by Professor Handler, the editors of the
Virginia Law Review had this to say: "Antitrust, perhaps to a greater extent than most
areas of the law, is subject to changing fashions. It is an area where the full potentiality
of traditional issues and approaches is not exhausted before new centers of legal atten-
tion appear. This result is probably dictated by the constantly changing character
of our economy." Introduction to, Handler, Emerging Antitrust Issues: Reciprocity,
Diversification and Joint Ventures, 49 VA. L. REV. 433 (1963).
2 9 
THE MORGAN GUARANTY SURVEY, A YEAR OF DECISION IN ANTITRUST 4 (1964).
30 There is some evidence that, in passing the Expediting Act, Congress did not
have in mind that only cases arising under the Sherman Act would be of importance,
but rather that cases arising under future antitrust statutes would also be of importance.
See 36 CONG. REc. 1679 (1903).
81 Act of October 25, 1914, ch. 323, 38 Stat. 730 (codified in scattered sections of
15 U.S.C.).
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menta2 to section 7 of that act was adopted. Over the years, moreover,
numerous regulatory statutes containing antitrust provisions have be-
come part of our law, and statutory exceptions to the reach of our
antitrust laws dot the legal landscape.
During the last twenty years many new and important interpreta-
tions of the antitrust laws and of their relationship to statutes of a
regulaory nature have been made by the Supreme Court. To name
just a few cases in which this occurred: Hartford-Empire,83 Para-
mount Pictures, 4 Line Material,3 5 Standard Stations, 6 International
Salt '7 Embassy Dairy,38 Parke Davis,9 the two duPont cases, 40 and
Brown Shoe.4 '
There are many antitrust matters of importance not yet resolved by
the Supreme Court. These would include questions pertaining to joint
ventures, reciprocity, conglomerate mergers, product extension mer-
gers, market extension mergers, consignment dealers, cooperative price
advertising, and oligopoly.
Despite the remarks of members of the Supreme Court in the Brown
Shoe and Singer cases,42 that Court remains a strong witness in support
of the point made here. Thus, in 1948, the Supreme Court noted that
it had before it an antitrust case of "first impression. '4 3 In 1962, 44 it
again made a similar comment in another antitrust case. And in 1963,
that Court stated in one case that, "This is the first case involving a
territorial restriction in a vertical arrangement." 45 That same year, in
another antitrust suit, the Court noted that "this is the first case which
has required this Court to consider the application of the antitrust laws
8264 Stat. 1125; 15 U.S.C. S 18 (1952).
83 Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386 (1945).
34 United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131 (1948).
35 United States v. Line Material Co., 333 U.S. 287 (1948).
80 Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293 (1949).
37 International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947).
88 Milk Producers Ass'n v. United States, 362 U.S. 458 (1960).
89 United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29 (1960).
40 United States v. duPont & Co., 351 U.S. 377 (1956); 353 U.S. 586 (1957).
41 Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
42 See earlier discussion under Topic III in this article.
43 United States v. Nat'l City Lines, 334 U.S. 573 (1948).
44 United States v. Wise, 370 U.S. 405 (1962).
45 White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 US. 253, 261 (1963).
SUPPORT OF THE EXPEDITING ACT
to the commercial banking industry. ' 48 And in 1964, once again, in an
antitrust case, it acknowledged that it was "ploughing new ground." 47
It appears clear that in view of the generality of the antitrust laws,
the changing methods of doing business, the ingenuity of those who
would rather try to avoid or evade the antitrust laws than submit
tamely to them, and the variance in the enforcement vigor and imagi-
nation of short tenure antitrust enforcers, the courts will continue to
be called upon to "plough new ground" in the field of antitrust.
b) The burden and scope of revie'w.-We turn to other arguments
advanced to justify repeal of the Expediting Act. It is said that anti-
trust cases come to the Supreme Court with long, complex records
which impose a great burden upon the Supreme Court,48 and that the
number of antitrust cases filed by the Government has been increas-
ing.49 These contentions have not gone unchallenged.50 Moreover, the
proposed bills are not confined to cases with long records, although a
substantial number of antitrust cases which come to the Supreme
Court do not have extensive records. Again, more often than not, anti-
trust cases with extensive records raise important issues of law, and the
Supreme Court's decisions in such cases have made them landmark
cases.
5
'
46 United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 324 (1963) and see id. at 337.
47 United States v. Penn-Olin, 378 U.S. 158, 169 (1964).
48 See Comment, The Case for Eliminating Direct Appeal to the Supreme Court in
Civil Antitrust Cases, 13 DEPAUL L. REV. 261, 263 (1964).
49 Ibid. The comment refers to some ninety cases filed in 1960. Most of such cases
were electrical equipment cases, a very rare situation. Normally, the number of cases
filed is considerably less. Many are criminal cases, and most of the civil cases are
settled before trial. The Supreme Court, during the last decade has had on the average
only a small number of government civil antitrust cases on its docket. It did have
more than usual during its 1963 term, but that number did not compare with the
thirteen cases, involving antitrust questions, in which it wrote opinions during its 1947
term. See Barnard & Zlinkoff, Patents, Procedure and the Sherman Act-The Supreme
Court and a Competitive Economy, 1947 Term, 17 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1, 2 (1948).
50 See Marcus, The Big Antitrust Case in the Appellate Courts, 56 Nw. U.L. REv. 756
(1962), in 1 HOFFMANN, ANTITRUST LAW AND TECHNIQUES 427 (1963). See also Wright,
The Overloaded Fifth Circuit: A Crisis in Judicial Administration, 42 TEXAS L. REv.
949, 952 (1964). Summary docket procedures and motions to affirm, as well as full scale
hearings, have been used to dispose of antitrust cases in the Supreme Court; and cases
have been disposed by that Court on records made on motions for summary judgment
in the district courts. It is worth noting that many district courts with the highest-
weighted caseload have not been courts in which government civil antitrust cases are
usually brought. See DIRECTOR OF ADMIN. OFFICE OF U.S. COURTS, ANN. REPT. 1963, at
138, 140. Generally as to the work load of the Supreme Court, see Gressman, Much Ado
About Certiorari, 52 GEO. L.J. 742 (1964).
51 Some of the early landmark antitrust cases had monumental factual records. In
one of such cases, counsel made helpful suggestions to the Supreme Court as to how
lengthy records might be handled. See Marcus, supra note 50, at 772.
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Frequently, by the time an antitrust case reaches the Supreme Court,
it is the inferences from the facts which are in dispute rather than the
facts themselves.
One commentator has contended that parties to an antitrust suit
would get a more thorough review by a court of appeals than by the
Supreme Court.52 Another commentator has questioned this assump-
tion on the basis of the Government's experience in criminal antitrust
appeals.58 It is believed that a comparison of the review given by
court of appeals in private antitrust cases, as appears from their
opinions, with that given by the Supreme Court in antitrust appeals,
would not demonstrate any greater thoroughness of review on the part
of the former. As far as the Supreme Court is concerned, its review of
the facts in an antitrust case, while sometimes considerably less than
comprehensive, in other instances is quite extensive. It is believed that
it is as hazardous to say that the factual review by the Supreme Court
of antitrust cases is not likely to be comprehensive as it is to say that it
will give a thorough factual review in every antitrust case.54 The re-
marks of some of the members of the Supreme Court in the Brown
Shoe and Singer cases55 may be compared with the comment of that
Court in an antitrust case with a long record. In the second duPont
case, the Court said:
'... Though the records are usually most voluminous and their review ex-
ceedingly burdensome, we have painstakingly undertaken to make certain
that justice has been done. . . .' The proper disposition of antitrust cases is
obviously of great public importance and their remedial phase, more often
than not, is crucial .... 6
If one assumes that most, or even many, government civil cases are
cases of public importance, there would appear to be a number of
drawbacks to review by federal courts of appeals, one of which we
shall advert to at this point.
Appellate practitioners and commentators are well, and oftentimes
unhappily, aware that the common use of panels of much less than the
full complement of judges of the particular court of appeals creates
52 Gesell, A Much Needed Reform-Repeal the Expediting Act for Antitrust Cases,
1961 Aurirrusr L. SYM. 98, 100.
53 Solomon, Repeal of the Expediting Act-A Negative View, 1961 ANTrITnusT L.
SYM. 94, 95.
64 See Marcus, supra note 50 at 760 et seq.
55 See discussion of these cases in Topic III of this article.
56 United States v. duPont & Co., 366 U.S. 316, 323 (1961).
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an element of chance-a roulette factor in the appellate process. With-
in the same appellate court a decision may go one way or another, de-
pending upon which three judges57 one draws on appeal. 58
One commentator does not see why, if criminal antitrust appeals and
appeals from Federal Trade Commission decisions go to the courts of
appeals, there should be a right or option to appeal directly to the
Supreme Court in government civil antitrust suits.59 There is a very
logical reason for making a distinction. Criminal antitrust cases rarely
involve other than "hard core" antitrust violations, where the law is
clear."0 Except in rare technical situations appeals in such cases are the
prerogative of the defendant and not of the Government, and a con-
victed defendant thus has a chance of getting more than one review of
his conviction.
Federal Trade Commission cases more often than not do not deal
with antitrust issues; misrepresentation and Robinson-Patman Act
issues comprise a major part of their caseload. It is only within recent
years that the Commission has tackled some important merger cases.
An argument might indeed be made for direct review to the Supreme
Court of such cases.' At any rate, the department store character of
5TThe possibility of en banc action is no answer. En banc rulings are very much the
exception, and if they were common there might be serious complaints about congested
calendars. Thus, in the important American Tobacco case, see infra, note 91, although
the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals considered several motions en banc, the twelve-hour
argument on the merits was heard by a panel of three judges. See also Wright, supra
note 50, at 972.
58An eye-opener situation occurred in the case of Eagle Lion Studios, Inc. v. Loew's
Inc., 248 F.2d 438 (C.A. 2, 1957), aff'd, 358 U.S. 100 (1958). In that private antitrust
case the District Court ruled in favor of the defendants. An appeal was taken to the
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, where it was heard by a panel of three
judges. One of the three was Judge Jerome Frank. Shortly before that Court's opinion,
Judge Frank died. The decision in which two of the original panel and a third member
of the Court participated, affirmed the Court below by a two to one vote. The dissent-
ing judge noted that if Judge Frank had lived, the vote would have been two to one the
other way. An appeal to the Supreme Court resulted in a four to four vote, which,
under its rules, amounted to an affirmance of the Court of Appeals ruling. See Wright,
supra note 50, at 970-71.
59 Comment, The Case for Eliminating Direct Appeal to the Supreme Court in Civil
Antitrust Cases, 13 DE PAUL L. Rav. 261, 268 (1964).
60 Two outstanding exceptions are United States v. A.M.A. 110 F.2d 703 (C.A. D.C.
1940); and 130 F.2d 233 (C.A. D.C. 1942); and American Tobacco case, see infra
note 91.
61 It may be observed that among the large numbers of private antitrust cases will
be found a generous sprinkling of those of little general importance or of little sub-
stance. This would seem to warrant appeals going to the court of appeals in private
antitrust cases. One should point out, however, that some Supreme Court rulings in
private antitrust cases have been of major significance.
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the operations of the Federal Trade Commission strongly militates
against direct review by the Supreme Court of such miscellany.
In regard to this issue, there seems to be an expressed or implicit
assumption by proponents of removal or curtailment of direct appeal
to the Supreme Court, that the Supreme Court is overburdened, while
in contrast the federal courts of appeals are well able to handle addi-
tional types of appeals because their burden is much less. 62 This
assumption is open to question unless we are ready to welcome the ad-
vent of large numbers of new court of appeals judges divided into
many panels.
In recent years the business of the United States Court of Appeals
has increased markedly. From fiscal year 1960 to 1961 the increase was
eight percent. This was true for the following fiscal year. And for
1963, the increase was thirteen percent. Since World War II the num-
ber of cases has approximately doubled.6 3 In 1964,4 5,437 appeals were
commenced. Although since 1949, nineteen judges have been added to
the United States Court of Appeals, at the end of fiscal year 1963 there
was a 14.1 per cent increase in pending cases over the preceding year,
the total number being 3,457."6 The overburden has been thought to be
acute in some circuits. 6 This is hardly a picture of appellate courts
being able to give a comprehensive review to government civil anti-
trust cases because of meager appellate business.66a
It is sometimes said, also, that the Supreme Court would be aided by
a prior review by a federal court of appeals.6 ' This argument would
seem to assume that most antitrust cases which would be reviewed by
a Court of Appeals would also be reviewed by the Supreme Court.",
Elsewhere in this article we point out how unlikely this is to be true.
And when a commentator suggests that the concurrent court finding
rule would be applicable,"" one suspects that, at least on the part of
62 Compare Justice Harlan's remarks in Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S.
290, 365 (1962) (dissenting and concurring in part).
63 DIRECTOR or ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, ANN. REPT. 1963 at 111.
64 Id. at 118. 65 Id. at 111, 119. 66 Id. at 111-12.
6ea The overburden of the federal courts of appeal is made clear in Wright, supra
note 50.
67 See comments of Justice Clark in Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294,
355 (1962) and United States v. Singer Co., 374 U.S. 174, 175 (1963).
68 See Brown Shoe Co., supra, note 67, where one judge suggested the Expediting
Act deprives litigants of an intermediate appeal.
69 Gesell, A Much Needed Reform-Repeal the Expediting Act for Antitrust Cases,
1961 ANTITRUST L. SYM. 98, 102.
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some proponents, there is a greater desire to insure limited review by
the Supreme Court than to have the latter's review obtain the benefit
of another court's consideration.
While it is likely that in some instances review by a court of
appeals might be helpful to the Supreme Court in the latter's review,
it is also likely that there would be instances where such intermediate
review might be less than helpful. 70 If the district court has done a
proper job of analyzing the facts and making findings of fact in an
antitrust case, the Supreme Court has the wherewithal to facilitate its
review. Granted that district judges are uneven in their performance
of such tasks, such unevenness is as likely to prevail among the divers
court of appeals and their panels. 71 The very fact that district courts
know there is likely to be a review by the Supreme Court is a
persuasive goad for a responsible performance on their part. It is likely
to be less of a persuasive goad to courts of appeals since review by the
Supreme Court would be less likely under the bills proposed.
IV. THE ARGUMENTS FOR DIRECT APPEAL
a) The nature and importance of the antitrust laws.-The grant by
the Expediting Act of direct appeal in government antitrust cases has
a firm foundation in the exceptional nature of our antitrust laws.71t
They are one of the most universally well known facets of our econ-
omy. They have been the focus of study and attention on a large scale
here and abroad.72 They have been admired or criticized as few other
bodies of law. They represent a most important cornerstone of our
entire system of free enterprise.
Their very generality has enhanced their importance and made all
the more desirable expeditious and authoritative determination of their
scope and meaning. Of the Sherman Act it has been said that "As a
charter of freedom, the Act has a generality and adaptability com-
70 Cf. Continental Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Co., 370 U.S. 690 (1962); Radiant
Burners v. Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co., 364 U.S. 656 (1961); Federal Trade Comm'n
v. Cement Institute, 33,3 U.S. 683 (1948).
71 It may be noted that a three-judge court of appeals panel may have a district court
judge on it.
71a In advocating special discovery rules in criminal antitrust cases, the argument
has been made that, "The wide impact of the decision in an antitrust. case makes it
especially important that it be correct." Comment, Discovery in Criminal Antitrust
Cases, 64 COLUM. L. REv. 735, 763-64 (1964).
72 In recent years study groups or individuals from Australia, England, West Ger-
many and Sweden have come to compare our antitrust systems with their own.
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parable to that found to be desirable in constitutional provisions. '"78
As Justice Frankfurter has noted, "The sweeping generality of the
antitrust laws differentiates them from ordinary statutes." 74
To amend the Expediting Act by eliminating antitrust cases from
its ambit would be to downgrade those laws. We live in a period
where, unfortunately, the concept and the application of the antitrust
laws have been the target for a heavy attack.75 One might well urge
that now is the time for a reiteration of our faith in the value and
importance of those laws and not a time to relegate them to the level
of a negligence action.
V. THE PLACE OF THE SUPREME COURT IN ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT
The Supreme Court has not been without its antitrust aberrations,
and the record of some members of that Court in antitrust cases has
not been that of a friend to antitrust.76 But over the years, and par-
ticularly in recent years, probably no government body has been
more clearly and effectively an exponent of antitrust enforcement
than the Supreme Court. Most students of antitrust would agree, I
believe, that while both the executive and the legislative branches
of the Government have had their moments of high contributions to
the development and enforcement of the antitrust laws, those mo-
ments have been much less numerous and less consistent than that of
the Supreme Court. This has been in sharp contrast to the attitude
taken by a number of district court judges and courts of appeals.
While no overall generalization may be fairly made, it is well known
that some of such latter judges and courts have shown a marked hos-
tility toward the application of the antitrust laws and to their philos-
ophy.77 It is believed that some part of the Expediting Act repeal
movement rests upon the realization by many that this is so.
78 Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344, 359-60 (1933). This thesis
has often been stressed by the Supreme Court.
74 United States v. duPont & Co., 366 U.S. 316, 363 (1961).
75 See, e.g., Wall Street Journal, March 19, 1964, p. 18; Bork & Bowman, The
Crisis in Antitrust, 68 FORTUNE 138 (Dec. 1963); Handler, What is Wrong 'with the
Antitrust La'ws, ANTITRusT BuLL. 557 (1963).
76 See Kramer, The Antitrust Division and the Supreme Court: 1890-1953, 40 VA.
L.J. 433 (1954).
77 See Hardy, The Evisceration of Section 5 of the Clayton Act, 49 Gao. L.J. 44,
68 (1960); also, Busin ss WEEK, Sept. 12, 1964 at 106. In United States v. Singer Mfg.
Co., 374 U.S. 174, 202 (1963), Justice Harlan, dissenting, observed that "The final out-
come of this case might indeed have been different had this Court had 'the valuable
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The Brown Shoe case,78 would seem to be a strange vehicle for the
carriage of the remarks of Justices Clark and Harlan to which we
have referred.79 Although the Celler-Kefauver Amendment to section
7 of the Clayton Act was enacted in 1950, the Brown Shoe case, de-
cided by the Supreme Court in 1962, was the first case in which that
Court was called upon to interpret that important amendment. By that
time there was a vast amount of confusion as to the scope and mean-
ing of the antimerger statute. That confusion was shared by the lower
courts, by the enforcement agencies, and by the commentators, all
operating in the vacuum created by the absence of Supreme Court
construction. The Supreme Court, in the Brown Shoe case, made
many important rulings which have served to guide the government
enforcement agencies and the lower courts in subsequent cases.8 0 If
this case had been decided by a court of appeals, such interpretations
might still be absent or never made, and this leads to a very important
consideration on this issue of direct appeal.
The Supreme Court, because of the pinnacle of its position and its
appreciation of the desirability of laying down antitrust principles,
has shown boldness in the breadth of its approach to the disposition
of an antitrust case81 that one does not find nor can one expect to find
on the part of the intermediate federal courts of appeals.8 2 Thus it
has been said, "The latitude the Court assumes in interpreting and
applying the antitrust laws is immense. '' s2a
In the landmark duPont-General Motors case, 8 the Supreme Court
assistance of the Court of Appeals.'" This observation, it is submitted, suggests the
desirability of the direct appeal rule, if two wrongs become a right when a case
reaches the Supreme Court after an intermediate appeal.
78 See supra note 62.
70 See earlier discussion in Topic III of this article.
80 "The blueprint for the superstructure was drawn in Chief Justice Warren's deci-
sion in the 1962 Brown Shoe case. In his discussion of the standards to be applied, the
Chief Justice set forth the interpretation of Congressional philosophy that has per-
meated subsequent applications of the law." THE MORGAN GUARANTY SURVEY, A YEAR
OF DECISION IN ANTITRUST 8 (1964).
81 This attitude is not a belated one of the Supreme Court. See Barnard & Zlinkoff,
Patents, Procedure and the Sherman Act-The Supreme Court and a Competitive
Economy, 1947 Term, 17 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 54-58 (1948).
82 See Gesell, supra note 2, at 102.
82a THE MORGAN GUARANTY SURVEY, supra note 80, at 6; and see BUsINESS WEEK,
Sept. 12, 1964, at 106-107.
83 United States v. duPont, 353 U.S. 586 (1957).
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decided the suit on a ground barely mentioned by the Government,
namely, the application of section 7 of the Clayton Act. It is doubtful
that the average intermediate court of appeals, in the face of the
Government's treatment of this issue, would have had the courage
and the feel for antitrust enforcement to have done likewise. In the
duPont case, also, the Supreme Court, to the great surprise of the legal
profession, held that the antimerger statute could be applied retro-
actively to an acquisition made two decades ago, by considering the
post-acquisition effect of the merger. It is hardly likely that any of
the court of appeals operating under the shadow of contemplated
overseership, let alone any considerable number of them, would have
taken such an uncharted course.
In the Philadelphia National Bank case, the appellees had contended
below that the Bank Merger Act had immunized mergers approved
by the banking authorities, from challenge under the federal antitrust
laws. Noting that this contention had been abandoned on appeal, the
Court said, "We consider it, nevertheless, because it touches the
proper relations of the judicial and administrative spheres."'8 4 The
trail-making ruling of the Court on this point has had far-reaching
effect. One might well doubt that a federal court of appeals would
have broken such ground under such circumstances.8 5 This was an-
other instance where although the Government had placed major
reliance upon the Sherman Act, the Court decided the case under
section 7 of the Clayton Act.
Antitrust decrees have often received special attention on the part
of the Supreme Court, and there have been instances where that Court
has added provisions to a decree. 6
At least twice in the last fifteen years the Supreme Court has led
the way in freeing antitrust cases from a strait jacket of unduly mas-
sive requirements of proof which posed a real threat to antitrust en-
forcement.8" And it has been the Supreme Court, of course, which
84 United States v. Philadelphia Nat. Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 350 (1963).
85 Thus in Continental Co. v. Union Carbide, 370 U.S. 690, 695 (1962), the Supreme
Court noted that, "The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit announced that its
task was to review the correctness of the judgment below, not the reasons therefor,
and on that basis affirmed the judgment." That approach is hardly one of clarification
of antitrust principles. And see, Penfield Co. v. Securities and Exch. Comm'n, 143 F.2d
746, 749 (1944).
S6 E.g., United States v. duPont & Co., 366 U.S. 316 (1961).
87 Federal Trade Comm'n v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37, 50 (1948); United States
v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 362 (1963). This is to be contrasted with the
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has pioneered in laying down per se rules in price-fixing s8 and in
other types of antitrust cases. Under a system of antitrust appeals to
the intermediate federal courts of appeals, one might envisage, with
some dismay, the likelihood of per se rules in some circuits and not
in others, at least for some period of time.
The direct appeal to the Supreme Court has resulted in providing
a uniform policy in antitrust matters for the federal courts.
In an antitrust appeal, what the court may say in its opinion may
be as important or more important than the fact of affirmance or re-
versal of the lower court. And what the Supreme Court says is likely
to be far more important than what is said by a court of appeals.
The case before the court may well-and often does-represent the
first time the industry involved has been subjected to a comprehensive,
factual survey, a survey in which the public has a very real interest.
In many instances the opinion of the court is the first opportunity the
public has had to know fact from propaganda. A Supreme Court deci-
sion normally would receive far greater attention than a lower court's
decision; and there are certain factors which favor opinions of the
Supreme Court over those of court of appeals. Generally, it can be
expected that the give-and-take between nine men of the caliber of
Supreme Court Justices is likely to lead to a greater exchange of ideas
and information, a better reasoned majority opinion and an important
dissenting opinion than in the case of three-judge deliberations.8 9
timidity or caution of the antitrust enforcement agencies in this respect. See Pillsbury
Mills, Inc., 50 F.T.C. 555, 564 (1953); Brownell, The Antitrust Aspects of Mergers,
Mimeographed address before the New York Chapter of the Public Relations Society
of America, Sept. 30, 1954, pp. 8-9. A former chief economist of the Federal Trade
Commission, in a speech, in 1962, before the Antitrust Section of the American Bar
Association, had this to say:
"'Unhappily the effective enforcement of the Celler-Kefauver Amendment to sec-
tion 7 was unduly delayed as a result of the initial approach taken by the Federal Trade
Commission's counsel in the first case brought under the new law, the Pillsbury
case ....
88 See, e.g., United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927).
89 It is common in argument before the Supreme Court to find more than three
judges asking questions of counsel designed to facilitate a proper disposition of the
appeal. In the long run a three-judge court is more likely to suffer from dearth of
such questions than a nine-judge court. Out of nine judges, it may be surmised that
there is a likelihood that at least one of them will be interested enough to make the
necessary extensive examination of a record or to have his law clerk do so. Out of
three judges, there may be less such likelihood. Admittedly, the factor of case load
would have to be considered in making any such comparison. On the factor of case
load, see DIRECTOR OF ADMIN. OFFICE OF U.S. COURTS, ANN. REp. 1963, Tables A-l, B-1.
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VI. THE PROBLEM OF DELAY AND EXPENSE
For the purpose of discussion of the subject matter under this head-
ing, we assume that there would be two appeals under the proposed
bills. Later on in this article we propose to expose the fallacy of such
assumption.
The Supreme Court has noted the opportunities for delay in anti-
trust cases prior to the enactment of the Expediting Act, when there
were two such possible appeals. 90 This is true today." This may be
because of the condition of a court's calendar, the premium on dila-
tory tactics, either because of the profit in continuing certain types
of antitrust violations until finally prevented by court order from do-
ing so or the difficulty in unscrambling particular situations after
long lapses of time, and mechanical and manpower problems involved
in two sets of appeals.
Denial of the right of direct appeal to the Supreme Court may
result in long delays before important principles of law in antitrust
cases are established, and before important antitrust cases are decided.
In antitrust cases, it is often important for an industry to have an early
definitive decision, whichever way the decision goes. Likewise, it is
often important for the public interest to have an early termination
of anticompetitive practices or of a monopoly situation.
92
90 United States v. California Canneries, 279 U.S. 533, 558 (1929).
9xJustice Clark, in Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 354 (1962), to
illustrate a contention that direct appeals seldom result in much expedition pointed
out that two and a half years had passed since the District Court's decision. That delay
occurred because of very unusual circumstances. The chief counsel for the appellants
during the pendency of the appeal was chief negotiator for the United States with
the Russians at disarmament conferences which took place at Geneva, Switzerland.
This was a major reason for delays in presenting the appeal. The Government, also,
at one point, found it necessary to ask for a delay because the person assigned to draft
its brief left to join another agency. It is this writer's belief that if an appeal had
had to be taken to the court of appeals there would have been at least an additional
year, perhaps two, before final disposition of this important case by the Supreme Court.
The above example may be compared with the time table in American Tobacco Co.
v. United States, 328 U.S. 781 (1946). That was a criminal monopoly case. The verdict
was handed down on October 27, 1941. An appeal was filed with the Sixth Circuit Court
of Appeals in December 1941, but not until April 1944 was it argued before that Court.
The Court's opinion was rendered in December 1944. The Supreme Court's opinion
in the case was handed down in June 1946. Thus, the appellate process in that case
took almost five years. I suspect that the lapse of such long period of time had much
to do with the failure of the Department of Justice to follow up the criminal case with
a civil suit.
92 The Kiplinger Washington Letter of May 31, 1963 advised that then was a
propitious time for mergers. One of the reasons advanced for this advice was that the
Government had recently lost a number of merger suits in the district court. The
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Some important government civil antitrust cases have been dis-
missed before trial or after the plaintiff had put in its case. When such
cases have been reversed on appeal, four or more years have elapsed
from the date of the filing of the complaint to the date of a final
judgment." There have been government antitrust cases, also, where
two successive appeals to the Supreme Court have been made. If, in
addition, intermediate appeals had been required, the time for dis-
position of such cases might be infinitely longer.
An antitrust case which has been around for a long time may lose
the attention it deserves or be subject to such pressure for disposition
as to jeopardize the purpose for which it was brought. As Professor
Handler has noted,94 it is not uncommon to have two or three com-
plete turnovers of Government trial attorneys between the beginning
and end of an antitrust case. Under such circumstance, it is hardly
the path of wisdom to add to the delay in final disposition of such
cases. Last year the median time from filing of the complete record
to final disposition in the courts of appeals was 7.3 months. 5
The expense to the litigants of two separate appeals, moreover, is
no small matter.9 6
Prolongation of the judicial process, moreover, might seriously
prejudice the use by private antitrust plaintiffs of section 597 of the
Clayton Act."'
Letter states: "Cases will be appealed to the Supreme Court, but this will take a couple
of years or so. Meanwhile, Justice is inclined to go easy on challenging any mergers
that are not fairly clear cases of monopoly or curtailment of competition." It may be
doubted that such advice should be encouraged by providing for the prolongation of
the judicial process through intermediate appeals.
93 Thus, in an antitrust case against the theatrical interests of the Shubert Brothers
when a trial, long delayed because of a change in government personnel, was in the
offing, the presiding judge dismissed the case on the ground taht theatrical enterprise
did not fall within the reach of the antitrust laws. An appeal to the Supreme Court
brought about a reversal, but meanwhile the case had lost its high place on the
court's calendar. The case was finally settled in February 1956, six years after the
complaint was filed.
94 Handler, Some Unresolved Problems of Antitrust, 62 COLUM. L. REv. 930, 956
(1962).
9 5 DREcTOR OF ADMIN. OFFICE OF U.S. COURTS, ANN. REP. 1963, Table B-4.
96 This factor has aroused some opposition to the proposed elimination of a direct
appeal to the Supreme Court. BUSINESS WEEK, May 4, 1963, at 90.
97 15 U.S.C. § 16 (1952).
98 See International Shoe Machine Corp. v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 315 F.2d
449 (CA. 1, 1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 820 (1963).
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VII. THE CERTIORARI ILLUSION
Proponents of the two bills are quick to assert that appeals to the
Supreme Court in antitrust cases are preserved through the route of
certiorari. It is submitted that this is illusory both as to protection of
the public interest and as to the appellate review afforded the liti-
gants.99
The grant of certiorari by the Supreme Court is certainly less com-
mon than a beautiful day in June. Grant of certiorari by the Supreme
Court is very much the exception.:00 There have been a number of
suits involving the Federal Trade Commission where the matter was
not settled by a Supreme Court decision until long after an initial
court of appeals decision and a considerable time after an inter-
circuit conflict had developed.
Thus during the ten-year period 1953 through 1962, fourteen de-
cisions of the courts of appeals in Federal Trade Commission cases
were appealed to the Supreme Court on the ground that there existed
a conflict of decision between various circuit courts of appeals. Of
these petitions for certiorari, only five were granted; in nine cases
certiorari was denied.
The Supreme Court has often denied certiorari in private antitrust
cases; in some instances the issues raised would lead many to feel that
they warranted a review by the Supreme Court.101
99 It is interesting to note that the President of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce,
speaking before the Democratic Convention's Committee on Resolutions and Platform,
favored the higher courts accepting more antitrust cases for review in order to keep
antitrust decisions in harmony with one another. BNA, Antitrust & Trade Regulations
Rept., August 25, 1964, at A-4; and see Solomon, Repeal of the Expediting Act-A Nega-
tive View, 1961 ANTITRUST L. SYM. 94, 96.
100 See DIRECTOR OF ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, ANN. REP. 1963, Table A-1.
Compare a recent comment by an official of the Federal Trade Commission: "We
received a serious setback in our enforcement activities when we lost the American Oil
Company case in the Seventh Circuit and the Supreme Court denied our petition for
review.... ." CONG. Rc., App. 4572 (daily ed. Sept. 2, 1964)..
101 An expert Supreme Court practitioner has said, "No one is really happy about
the certiorari jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, least of all the justices themselves.
Every reasonably well informed observer of the process can point to questions deemed
unworthy of review at one time that obtained review thereafter." Wiener, Federal
Regional Courts: A Solution for the Certiorari Dilemma, 49 A.B.A.J. 1169 (1963).
Among government antitrust cases which might well have been sidetracked by the
certiorari barrier are the first duPont case, United States duPont, 351 U.S. 377 (1956),
and the second duPont case, United States v. duPont, 353 U.S. 586 (1957)-one de-
cided by a 3 to 2 vote and the other by 4 to 3. If the second duPont case had gone up
to the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals and had been affirmed on the ground of no
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In 1944, a court of appeals decided that the disolution of a cor-
poration was cause to dismiss an antitrust indictment against it.1 02
Not until fifteen years later was the Supreme Court willing to review
that question. When it did so, there was unanimous rejection of the
rule which had been generally used by the lower courts for a decade. 10 3
The Supreme Court's failure to take certiorari in an antitrust case
may impose great burdens on courts of apeals and on litigants. Thus,
as a result of the Government's electrical equipment company cases,
numerous private antitrust cases were filed all over the country. The
defendants in many of these cases interposed the defense of the statute
of limitations and the plaintiffs contended the statute was tolled by
the doctrine of fraudulent concealment. The district courts divided
on this issue. Certiorari was requested from the first ruling by a court
of appeals on this issue. Denial thereof resulted in a number of other
appeals to different Courts of Appeals having to be prosecuted al-
though thus far they have all ruled the same way.
There is another illusory aspect to certiorari as an appellate path
for antitrust cases to the Supreme Court. An appeal to the Supreme
Court by the United States needs first to be approved by the Solicitor
General. That office has always been concerned over its certiorari
record, that is, how many of its petitions are granted, and such ap-
proval is not given as a matter of course. °03
The Solicitor General's office has on occasion refused to approve
recommendations from the Federal Trade Commission for appeal to
the Supreme Court; and there have been occasions when the Com-
mission has been allowed to appeal without approval of its position
by the Solicitor General and the Commission has won in the Supreme
violation of the Sherman Act, it is not at all certain that application for certiorari
would have been granted by the Supreme Court. It is even problematical whether
the Solicitor General's office would have authorized the filing of a petition for
certiorari in such event.
102 United States v. Safeway Stores, 140 F.2d 834 (C.A. 10, 1944).
103 Melrose Distillers v. United States, 359 U.S. 271 (1959). The chronology of this
issue was that in 1944 the Solicitor General's office was unwilling to permit an applica-
tion for certiorari to the Supreme Court. Some ten years later it approved the filing
of such a petition but certiorari was denied by the Supreme Court. Not until a court
of appeals in a non-antitrust case departed from the rule obtaining in other federal
circuits, did the Supreme Court accept certiorari.
103a See Gressman, Much Ado About Certiorari, 52 GEO. L.J. 742, 764 note 56, at 764
(1964).
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Court.0 It was only a few years ago that one of the Federal Trade
Commissioners strongly criticized the Solicitor General's office for its
attitude on appeals recommended by the Federal Trade Commission.10 5
The Solicitor General, or a member of his staff, may well differ with
the Antitrust Division as to both the possibility of success in the
Supreme Court and as to what is a matter of general public interest.
Occasionally, the Solicitor General's office has refused to allow the
Antitrust Division to take an appeal in an antitrust case. 1° a Neverthe-
less the Solicitor General's office finds it difficult to turn down a re-
quest for an appeal to the Supreme Court because, if it does, there
will be no appeal at all. 10
Without this factor, it is not improbable that in a number of in-
stances, if an appeal were taken to a court of appeals, the Antitrust
Division would not be permitted to petition for certiorari to the
Supreme Court, especially in cases with long records.
Last year, in merger case after merger case, the district courts held
against the Government. Most of them were appealed, with success,
to the Supreme Court. It is certainly very doubtful that if they had
been lost in courts of appeals, the Solicitor General would have
permitted the filing of certiorari in all such cases, 10 7 or that if petitions
had been filed, all would have been granted by the Supreme Court.
If a government antitrust case were appealed to the court of ap-
peals without a certificate of public importance having been requested
or granted, it would seem difficult in a petition to the Supreme Court
for certiorari from a decision by the court of appeals to argue that
the case was one of general public importance. And if a certificate had
been requested by a party and denied by a district court, a court of
104 E.g., St. Regis Paper Co. v. United States, 368 U.S. 208 (1961). In that case the
Solicitor General took a position before the Supreme Court contrary to that of the
Federal Trade Commission.
105 Remarks by Commissioner William C. Kern before the Mechanical Contractors
Associations of Texas, Inc., January 14, 1961.
105a Cf. BusINEss WEEK, Sept. 13, 1964 at 106.
106 Occasionally, the Solicitor General's office has permitted an appeal against its
better judgment and its judgment has been proven wrong.
107 It may be noted that in quite a number of recent merger cases lost in the federal
courts, the Solicitor General asked for additional time in order to determine whether
to perfect an appeal.
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appeals might start its review of the case wtih something less than
major interest.
The type of review that the Supreme Court might give upon cer-
tiorari from a court of appeals' decision might be quite different and
much less comprehensive than in cases reviewed upon direct appeal
from a district court. 08
Another dubious aspect of the use of certiorari is that it is almost
certain that if direct appeals to the Supreme Court were abolished,
antitrust law would differ for long periods of time in different parts
of the country. And it should be noted that even if an appeal is taken
to the Supreme Court by certiorari, many important issues may re-
main undecided if, as it has done, it limits the questions it will take
on certiorari. 09
It has already been pointed out that one troublesome factor in
giving the Attorney General discretion as to what is a case of general
importance is the difficulty of determining which ones are of general
importance. 10 And that extraneous factors may go into such deter-
mination is apparent from the infrequency of such determinations
being made for invocation of section 1 of the Act."' Furthermore,
to give such discretion to one litigant is to raise grave questions of
fairness. Moreover, to leave the question of jurisdiction of the Su-
preme Court to the determination of a single individual, also raises
troublesome questions.
108 For a narrow view of the reviewing function of the Supreme Court where a
review has been had by a court of appeals, see Federal Trade Comm'n v. Standard
Oil Co., 355 U.S. 396 (1958).
109 See American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 324 U.S. 836, 328 U.S. 824.
110 The Attorney General's legislative proposal to amend the Expediting Act might
be regarded by some as a predetermination that most government civil antitrust cases
are not of general public importance. On questions of this sort the record of the De-
partment of Justice is somewhat puzzling. Motions to affirm, supposedly, are used
when a case or the issues are regarded as of little importance or clear-cut. Yet the
landmark decision of the Supreme Court in Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United
States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951), was preceded by a motion to affirm by the Government
(denied). In Hughes v. United States, 342 U.S. 353 (1952), the Department of Justice
filed a motion to affirm (denied). The case was reversed by the Supreme Court by
an 8 to 0 vote. In the Brown Shoe case, supra, despite its importance, the Department
of Justice filed a motion to affirm. Later it had to eat some of the de minimis argu-
ments it had made in support of that motion.
"' One wonders whether there would be appeals to the Supreme Court on the
question of whether a case was one of "general public importance."
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VIII. INTERLOCUTORY APPEALS
Proposals to afford antitrust litigants appeals from interlocutory or-
ders, in certain situations, seem called for." 2 But the desirability of
such relief does not warrant the undesirable effects of the far-reaching
provisions of S. 1811 and S. 1862.
IX. CONCLUSION
Folklore tells of how a battle was lost for want of a nail. We should
be most chary of cerating a situation where, for want of a direct appeal
to the Supreme Court, antitrust falters or founders.
The Expediting Act has served us well in providing a uniform in-
terpretation of the antitrust laws and the promotion of their policy
and enforcement. Its benefits should continue to be available to anti-
trust.
112 See Comment, The Case for Eliminating Direct Appeal to the Supreme Court
in Civil Antitrust Cases, 13 DE PAUL L. REv. 261, 264-67 (1964).
